It is a year since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, and the United States is still in what could be called a war spirituality. The spirituality of the nation has indeed changed significantly. "America strikes back" is a widespread theme. Nationalism is greatly increased. Flags are still displayed by some, although not as many. $40 billion has been shifted to military spending, not including special appropriations for the cost of the war on Afghanistan, and special appropriations for Homeland Security, and appropriations to the Department of Energy to develop new, usable nuclear weapons and to prepare to resume nuclear bomb testing in violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Money has been shifted away from programs for education, colleges, the needy, health insurance for children, and other human needs. State budgets are in deficit, so states are making more severe cuts in education and healthcare. Dissent is discouraged. Media, including Christian journals, are reluctant to print other views. Worship, teaching, and discussion in many churches, synagogues, and mosques have been narrowed in their breadth of focus, influenced by the shift in the culture, except that some have reached out to Muslims, thus creating that specific broadening of focus. A degree of fear is in the back of the minds of many. At the time of this writing, the administration is raising momentum toward war with Iraq. The government has shifted its Mideast policy, siding more with Ariel Sharon's military actions to suppress Palestinians and less with Palestinians' demand for dignity, justice, and a viable state. In fact, U.S. reliance on military and financial repression of terrorist cells that it can find rather than on demands for justice and dignity in that respect bears partial resemblance to Sharon's tactics. It does not involve, however, the extensive takeover, enforced no-travel, and assassinations. Europeans and Arabs express distress at U.S. unilateralism and withdrawal from treaties. The practice of airline travel has been altered dramatically. Airlines are in deficit, some rental car companies in bankruptcy. The economy, already in recession in March before September 11th, is flattened.

Is it time to turn to a deeper analysis of the roots of terrorism and terrorist recruitment? To be effective in combating terrorism and achieving better security, do we need something more than attacks on known terrorists and potential terrorists, and financial pressure? Is it time to begin discussing initiatives that can decrease the resentment and anger that drive people to turn to terrorism? Is it time to turn to just peacemaking theory for help in suggesting preventive initiatives?

In an article in the CSSR Bulletin of Spring, 1997, "New Paradigm: Just Peacemaking Theory," I introduced the work of 23 scholars developing a new paradigm for the ethics of peace and war, "Just peacemaking theory." After four and a half years of work together, we had reached unanimous consensus in our final working conference at the Carter Center in Atlanta. The result was a paradigm with ten practices that had demonstrated their effectiveness in preventing war in the empirical reality of history since World War II. The consensus theory was published the next year, 1998, as Just Peacemaking: Ten Practices for Abolishing War (Pilgrim Press), Glen Stassen, ed. It is a consensus document, a new paradigm, and not merely a collection of essays. The ten practices were designed to be acceptable to persons of varieties of
faith or no faith, similar to the eight criteria of just war theory. Each was based on empirical research that demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing wars, combined with the moral argument that we have an obligation to try what has been shown to be effective in preventing war, and so has appeal to persons of various faiths. The ten practices work to prevent war. Can they work to prevent terrorism?

**From a Realist Perspective**

But as soon as that question is posed in the present context of the spirituality of war, one thinks of the powers and interests that oppose asking it. Reinhold Niebuhr was my teacher, and he still teaches us that we need analysis of power and interest. What powers block raising the question of the roots of terrorism? What other forces can support implementing the practices of just peacemaking theory, so they can do their work in preventing terrorism and increasing our security?

One power reality is the unrivaled military power of the United States. The U.S. military budget is larger than the next eight nations combined. No nation can challenge U.S. military superiority directly. The U.S. economy is huge; it and the increasing concentration of wealth in ever-merging transnational corporations creates economic and political power imbalances throughout the world. This combination of overwhelming military and economic power weakens the ability of other nations to provide checks and balances against unwise or erroneous U. S. actions. Furthermore, the spirituality of nationalism that has resulted from the shocking attack of 9-11 polarizes the national spirit and disinclines many from questioning the drift, in a way analogous to the polarization in Israel after repeated terrorist attacks. Additionally, the nation is so large and the television news is so disengaged from the world that most people know very little about world concerns. Politically, the leaders of the Democratic party have decided to support whatever the government does on terrorism as the next election approaches. Beginning office with fewer votes than Gore got, and lacking a mandate or even respect from many, President Bush received a huge boost from leading the nation in striking back, and therefore may be psychologically fixed in the mode of leadership by military assertion. Further terrorist attacks would probably convince many not that policy should change, but that we need more of the present policy. The president is giving a huge tax rebate to the nation's wealthy, which makes much of the power of wealth disinclined toward strongly questioning policies.

Facing these power realities makes us aware of the great danger of national ignorance of the concerns of other nations. The United States is something like an empire, and there seems to be no rival force that could check and balance arrogance of power, should arrogance of power ever arise.[1] Perceiving these power realities, Niebuhr would ask: How can we lessen the temptations inherent in having such great concentration of power unchecked by rivals? Where do we get the force to cause us to think more deeply and act more sensitively?

Just war theory or pacifism understood simply as the restraint of war are not likely to provide satisfactory answers. If they conclude it is wrong to attack Iraq, or wrong to carry out some other military actions, people will want to ask, "what are the alternatives?" People want action to enhance security. Only a paradigm that points to effective terrorism-preventing actions can suggest satisfactory answers. Pacifism as opposition to violence gets limited hearing, and it
is asked the question that it asks itself: What are the alternatives? Never has it been clearer that we need an ethic that points us to practices that work to heal the causes of war and terrorism.

Wherever one enters into discussion, one is struck by people's failure to envision constructive alternatives. I propose that we begin discussing our situation a year after 9-11 and the "strikes back" strategy that followed by thinking with the help of some of the practices of just peacemaking theory as in Just Peacemaking: Ten Practices, hereafter referred to as JPTP. What alternatives does just peacemaking theory raise for discussion? And what powers and interests can push that discussion?

Nonviolent Direct Action

In describing the first practice of just peacemaking--nonviolent direct action--the book quotes Daniel Buttry: "The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a transformation of the way people engage in struggles for freedom, justice, peace, and human rights. Wars, insurgencies, ethnic violence, and acts of terrorism still occur with horrifying frequency and tragic consequences, but for the first time in human history a global phenomenon of nonviolent movements shook up political powers, redrew national boundaries, and brought hope to millions of people ground down by oppression and poverty" (JPTP, 32). "Governments must make room for, must respect, such movements" (45). Mubarak Awad represents Christian Palestinians who were training people in tactics of nonviolent direct action, but who were deported by the government of Israel. In view of the disastrous results of terrorism for both Israelis and Palestinians, it seems clear they both would be much better off if Palestinians relied on nonviolent direct action. What force could get that to happen? Surely the suffering that Israel and Palestine are experiencing from the present vicious cycles is such a force. But both operate with the theory that they do not want to reward violence, rather than the theory that justice and security achieved decrease violence. More Palestinian leaders could call for a switch to nonviolent direct action instead of terrorism. Israel could choose one city where nonviolent direct action is being organized such as Bethlehem and reward it by giving the self-rule that the Oslo Accords promised. And then expand self-rule, step by step, wherever nonviolent action has some advocates.

Arab and Muslim anger over injustice toward Palestinians, perceived as supported by the U.S. government, is the greatest source of widespread resentment, and a major factor in causing terrorism. Hence my first examples of just peacemaking initiatives focus here.

The Strategy of Independent Initiatives

Second, Independent initiatives is the strategy that was practiced successfully to get rid of many of the world's nuclear weapons, although very many still remain. One side announces a series of visible and verifiable initiatives that decrease the threat to the other side without making the initiator weak, and invites reciprocation. Absolutely crucial is to carry out the initiatives by the announced deadline, in spite of provocation that sometimes comes from agitators opposed to peace: the point is to decrease distrust, and missing the deadline only increases the distrust. When the two sides signed the Oslo agreement in 1993 recognizing Israel and its need for security, and setting dates for stages of return of Palestinian land to Palestinian
rule, Palestinian support for the agreement was initially 67% in the key poll, and this rose to 80% as the first parts of land were returned. Support for violence against Israel plummeted to 20%, and actual violence was very low. Netanyahu took office in 1996, and postponed the return of land indefinitely. Expectations of a permanent peace settlement in polls of Palestinians dropped from 44% to 30% in Netanyahu's first year, to 24% under Barak (with settlements expanding more rapidly than previously), and to 11% under Sharon, with his canceling of the negotiations at Taba that were following up the Barak offer. Support for violence against Israel increased inversely, both in the polls and in actuality. If the settlements keep expanding and no peace is worked out, support will continue to shift from Arafat and the old guard to more radical and violent Islamicist elements. This can have devastating consequences for justice and peace in the Middle East, and will dramatically erode Islamic support for the campaign against terrorism.

In another case of independent initiatives, Prime Minister Ehud Barak saw that Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon was indefensible both morally and militarily, and announced Israel would withdraw by July. He met the deadline, the troops withdrew, Lebanon celebrated, and southern Lebanon was not used for violent attacks against Israel. Polls in Israel showed strong support for the action, and the world applauded.

What independent initiative could be taken now? Arafat did call effectively for a halt to terrorist attacks in December 15, 2001, and violence dropped to 20% of the previous level, for almost two months. Sharon, however, did not reciprocate, but instead attacked in retaliation against the remaining terrorism. Arafat could take this initiative again, and this time the U.S. could act swiftly to ask firmly for Israeli reciprocation.

What independent initiative could the U.S. government take? The main source of distrust and resentment for Palestinians has been the steady increase of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians say that even after the Oslo Accords, even during the most allegedly peace-prone Israeli governments, more and more Palestinian land keeps being occupied by settlers, more and more Palestinian orchards and homes keeps being bulldozed, more and more bypass roads that Palestinians cannot use, enforced by Israeli military, carves up their land so that they can hardly travel in their own land and the map of their land looks like a case of the measles. These settlements are lavishly subsidized by the Israeli government, so that land and utilities are free, etc. Realism says peace will not come until these settlements are reversed. Polls show most Israelis know that and would support it. But realism also says that Ariel Sharon is not going to agree to give up the settlements: his nickname is "bulldozer," he himself is responsible for the settlement policy, and his political power depends on some parties of the right that are committed to the settlement policy. This is a classic vicious cycle of distrust. The two sides are stuck.

The Bush administration has declared support for a viable Palestinian state. This requires relinquishment of some settlements. Can the U.S. take an initiative that does not depend on Sharon withdrawing support from the settlements? The U.S. gives Israel several billion dollars each year. It should earmark a portion of the aid for buying settlers' homes at something like twice their value, thus reversing the financial incentives, contingent on the settlers returning to Israel and investing the money in housing there, so Israel does benefit from the investment. Not all settlers would sell, but polls indicate most would. Palestinians would finally see the
momentum shifting toward reducing settlements rather than continuously proliferating them. Settlers who found their numbers dwindling to a small proportion of a particular settlement but determined to stay in Palestine would likely move to another settlement if not back to Israel. Palestinians could buy housing at very generously reduced prices, as Israelis had done in the first place. With such a process progressing, why push terrorism?

JPTP identifies the realistic limitation of the strategy of independent initiatives: threatened governments fear communicating weakness. It advocates that governments "communicate firmness in resisting aggression as well as receptiveness to de-escalation" (JPTP 52). The U.S. is surely already communicating firmness in resisting terrorism. It can afford to earmark some of its aid for purchasing the homes of those settlers who would sell, which might be the most effective way to increase the security of Israel against terrorist attacks, and one of the most effective ways to decrease the resentment against the U.S. that causes terrorist recruitment. The book also points out realistically that governments have seldom taken independent initiatives unless grass-roots groups in civic society are urging peacemaking initiatives. Politicians need political support before they take initiatives. Here is a role for faith-based groups who want to push for specific and realistically possible peacemaking initiatives.

Conflict Resolution

The just peacemaking practice of conflict resolution has worked to achieve peace between Israel and Egypt, Israel and Jordan, as well as the hopeful results of the Oslo Accords until those Accords were not carried out. Crucial to conflict resolution is to identify some valid interests of the other side that can be affirmed, even while disagreeing about some interests. The Palestinian interest in the right of return to Israel is not likely to be affirmed, since large numbers of Palestinian voters in Israel would threaten the existence of a Jewish state. East Jerusalem is very difficult. But it is clear to almost everyone that the interest of Palestinians that has the best likelihood of being affirmed is their right to a viable state in Gaza and the West Bank. That will require curtailing and reversing the expansion of Jewish settlements and the occupation. The most pressing valid interest of Israel is for security from terrorist attacks. Therefore it was a realistic and greatly hopeful development when all the Arab neighbor nations around Israel, led by Saudi Arabia, agreed to offer peace, security, and normal relations to Israel if there can be a return to 1967 borders. They allowed the possibility of some adjustment in the borders: Israel could keep some settlements if it would give some compensating land to Palestine elsewhere. They did not demand the right of return or a specific solution in Jerusalem.

"The delayed reaction of the Bush administration to the peace initiative floated by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah has left many perplexed. With violence in the Middle East escalating daily, officials in Europe and the Arab world had beseeched Washington to intervene.... Yet the White House... was slow to take concrete action, waiting until March 8th to send its special envoy, retired U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, back to the region.... Surveys taken in the late 1990s showed that more than 80% of American Jews wanted the United States to apply pressure to both sides to help reach a settlement.... An October 2001 survey, sponsored in part by New York's The Jewish Week, found that 85% of American Jews believe it is important for the United States to become more involved in ending the violence between Israelis and Palestinians."[3]
Conflict resolution is also instructive for relations with Iraq—another major source of anger against the U.S. On the one hand, the U.S. and U.N. demand has been unhindered inspections for possible weapons of mass destruction, and ongoing monitoring thereafter. But achieving that requires affirmation of the interest of the Iraqi government in its own survival. The Clinton administration, however, stated that even if inspections were successfully carried out, it would still seek to topple Hussein. And the U.S. blocked talks about easing the economic sanctions. That removed the incentive for Saddam Hussein to allow inspections in hopes of a happier future. The Bush administration has intensified the counter-productive demand, insisting on regime change and vetoing talks regardless of Iraq's request to talk about resuming inspections. Conflict resolution says the U.S. should offer peace if Iraq allows unhindered inspections and ongoing monitoring afterwards. Both just peacemaking theory and just war theory insist that conflict resolution must be employed before war is tried.

Acknowledging Responsibility

The practice of acknowledging responsibility for conflict and injustice by the governments of Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States and has helped greatly to heal past wounds in several cases. In the culture of the Mideast, where honor and shame matter greatly and dignity has been systematically attacked, it would be enormously healing if either the government of Israel or Palestine could acknowledge publicly that they have engaged in actions that have caused enormous suffering and have themselves contributed to the vicious cycles of injustice and revenge, and would give evidence of sincerity by taking some serious initiatives showing repentance and forgiveness. But realistically, it is difficult to imagine the present governments acting in such a healing way. It is even difficult to imagine the present U.S. government acknowledging its own complicity in some of the vicious cycles. Doing so could help significantly in lessening the resentment behind terrorism. Many Israeli citizens understand Israeli complicity, and some Palestinians see likewise, as well as do many U.S. citizens. But government apology for its role in past hurts such as England's and America's toward Rwanda, or of President Clinton's toward Guatemala, is not likely from the present regimes.

Advance Religious Liberty, Human Rights, and Democracy

One strikingly effective way to reduce war and terrorism is to spread religious liberty, human rights, and democracy. A realistic force for human rights began when the Roman Catholic church at Vatican II and other church groups added their voices to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Then president Jimmy Carter led Congress to evaluate nations' human rights records annually, and to make improvement a condition for receiving U.S. economic aid. The result has been dramatic: every Latin American country, many of which had been militarily supported dictatorships, is now officially a democracy, although some are still in process of making that full reality. A similar story is unfolding in Eastern Europe, and change is happening in Asia and Africa. Data demonstrate that democratic states with human rights almost never directly make war against other democratic states with human rights, although admittedly the U.S. funded and supported the overthrow of the popular government of Iran that brought the Shah to power, the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile that brought the notorious Pinochet to power, and the Contras in Nicaragua that sought to topple the democratically elected Sandinista government.
by means of terrorism, etc.

Bin Laden and several of the terrorists who attacked the twin towers were Saudis. Saudi Arabia is governed by a tight family circle. Free discussion, political parties, elections, and citizen input are all stifled and suppressed. Opposition groups know that the U. S. government supports the ruling group in Saudi Arabia, and that the U.S. military base on Saudi soil ties the U.S. military to support for the status quo and stifles movements for change. Moreover it brings non-Muslim, secular influences onto the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia, the home of the Mecca. It was when the U.S. military established a base in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War that Bin Laden, in revulsion, was converted to terrorism. People commit to become terrorists when they see no other way to remove bitter injustice. Not only do they see governments like that of Saudi Arabia and Egypt as dictatorial, but they see the U.S. as the imperial supporter of their dictatorial governments. One of the most effective ways to dry up terrorism is for the U.S. to support trends toward human rights and democracy. Based on extensive empirical analysis, Rudolph Rummel found that on the whole, democracies have far fewer massacres, civil wars, and terrorist violence, and dictatorships have far more.[4] Terrorists come mostly from countries ruled by authoritarian and non-democratic governments, and they see the United States not as the democratic country that we see in our own mirrors, but as the powerful supporter of authoritarian governments for the sake of oil.

Egypt has just imprisoned 63-year-old Eddin Ibrahim for seven years of hard labor along with four colleagues from the leading Arab world think tank for political reform, on the charge of sullying Egypt's reputation by his work with the Arab Human Rights Organization. He has consistently persuaded Egyptians to work within the electoral system and not to do terrorist violence. ÒThe U.S. meekly expressed only Ôdisappointment' about the jailing of Ibrahim. The amorphous war against terrorism tacitly licenses friendly dictatorships to imprison peaceful opponents."[5] The U. S. has great leverage on Egypt because it gives several billions of dollars in aid each year, but apparently is using its leverage to get cooperation in the military war on terrorism rather than the democracy struggle against terrorism. A small group of Egyptian nationals, led by the blind cleric, Umar abd al-Rahman, was convicted of the first attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993. They also had plans to kill Mubarak and Boutros Boutros Ghali, the Egyptian who served as General Secretary of the United Nations. The apparent ringleader for the September 11th hijackings and attacks was Muhammad Atta, an Egyptian. Taped messages from Osama bin Laden also featured the number two leader in the al-Qaeda movement: an Egyptian physician named Ayman al-Zahwari. These radicals have grown in the context of resentment against poverty and the stifling of democratic participation.[6]

Defining the war on terrorism as primarily a military struggle is causing the U.S. to make stronger alliances with the militaries of countries like Indonesia, where the militaries have been the opponents of human rights and democracy. If Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation in the world, can make a successful transition to democracy, and the U.S. can support that, it will be the best example possible for Muslims worldwide. If on the other hand military denomination returns, as it did during the massacres in Indonesia's former colony, East Timor, then the struggle against terrorism will be greatly set back.[7]

Surely this suggests that if the war on terrorism is to be effective, U. S. policy should
shift toward encouraging human rights and democratic trends among nations of the Middle East. Ray Takeyh points out that

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia electrified the Arab populace. Their demands were simple but profound. As one Egyptian university student explained in 1993, "I want what they have in Poland, Czechoslovakia: freedom of thought and freedom of speech." [8]

Takeyh points to "a new generation of Islamist thinkers, who have sought to legitimize democratic concepts through the reinterpretation of Islamic texts and traditions.... Under these progressive readings, the well-delineated Islamic concept of shurai (consultation) compels a ruler to consider popular opinion and establishes the foundation for an accountable government." [9] Mohammed taught that "Difference of opinion within my community is a sign of God's mercy." Here is a basis for welcoming open discussion. Muslim democracy will not be identical to liberal Western democracy; some restrictions in lifestyle for the morality of the community are likely to be an intrinsic part. But U. S. support for tendencies toward the growth of Muslim forms of democracy is likely both to decrease resentment against the United States by opposition groups and to encourage the growth of more responsive governments that do not breed the bitter resentment of terrorism. "Even though an Islamic democracy will resist certain elements of post-Enlightenment liberalism, it will still be a system that features regular elections, accepts dissent and opposition parties, and condones a free press and division of power between branches of state." [10]

Nowhere is this more needed than in Palestine. Arafat's ability to reign in terrorism depends on greater transparency and less corruption, an independent judiciary, respect for the rule of law, a stronger legislature, stronger and more efficient institutions, and checks and balances against corruption. This is what the young guard in Palestine demands, and they will either get it from the present regime or become increasingly revolutionary and give greater support to militant Islamicist movements. [11] The United States needs to think not only of making peace between Palestine and Israel, but of encouraging good government and democracy in Palestine. Just peacemaking theory not only can reduce terrorism, it can point the United States toward being what we claim is our strength--an influence for human rights, liberty, and justice for all peoples. The Bush administration push for elections and reform have the potential for significant benefit. But realistically, unless it is accompanied by firm leadership toward justice for Palestinians before elections rather than after, it is likely to lead to more, not less, confrontational leadership.

**Sustainable Economic Development**

Just peacemaking theory directs us also to the importance of sustainable economic development if we are to reduce the violence and shrink the sources of recruitment to terrorism. Based on massive longitudinal and cross-national data, Why Men Rebel by Ted Gurr [12] argues that relative economic deprivation is the greatest cause of intranational violence, which is the most frequent kind of war the world now experiences. Terrorism is a form of rebellion, bred by bitter resentment over injustice and a sense of victimhood and powerlessness to make correction
by other means. Effective assistance developing sustainable and more equitable economies will be less expensive than being the object of the resentment that terrorist attacks express, and than an ongoing worldwide violent war against terrorism. Strobe Talbott writes that about half the people on earth are struggling to survive on less than $2 a day, the numbers of the poor are growing faster than the rich, and the gap between them is widening. Disease, overcrowding, undernourishment, political repression, and alienation breed despair, anger, and hatred."

Programs that are instrumental in getting at the roots of terrorism are more in jeopardy now than they were two months ago. The blank check that Congress seems willing to write is for enhancing military defenses (including a national anti-missile system).... In the budget crunch ahead, there will be a temptation to squeeze down the very programs that will allow us to move from reactive, defensive warfare against the terrorists to a proactive, prolonged offensive against the ugly, intractable realities that terrorists exploit and from which they derive popular support, foot soldiers, and political cover.[13]

President Bush has called for a $5 billion increase in U.S. economic aid to developing nations over the next three years. The U.S. is now 20th among industrialized nations in the per capita percentage of income that it gives to economic aid, and a $5 billion increase will help. Realistic analysis asks the interest underlying this increase. The administration needs incentives to persuade nations to support the war on terrorism. Realism suggests we need to increase support for citizen groups like Bread for the World that focus on where the aid goes and how it is used. The increase can be used for a significant improvement in economic conditions where poverty is the rule.

Emerging Cooperative Forces in the International System, and the United Nations

Two further practices of just peacemaking that have demonstrated effectiveness in preventing numerous wars are the emerging cooperative forces in the international system, and the United Nations. These are causing Øfar more peace than one could explain" without their existence. But the blocking force is the free-rider problem: ØEveryone benefits in international society from general peace, freedom for trade, freedom of the seas, free exchange of information, and the like." Yet states are tempted Øto make others obey the rules and pay the costs while one's own state breaks the rules and gets the benefits free" (JPTP 136f.). Five forces explain the dramatic increase of international networks and order in our time: 1) the drastic increase in the cost and destructiveness of war and decline in its usefulness. 2) the powerful rise of trade, rather than war, as the route to achieving what citizens want and demand. 3) Øthe dramatic increase in the volume, density, and speed of international exchanges, communications, and transactions...and the increasing integration of these exchanges into organized, complex, international, supranational, and transnational networks, corporations, and other institutions...[and] an equally startling increase in the number, scope, durability, and effectiveness of international organizations of all kinds, both governmental and nongovernmental, to which both modern governments and nongovernmental groups must pay attention...." 4) A gradual ascendency of liberal representative democracy. 5) the demands of people for basic rights of security and subsistence (138, 149, 151). These forces pressure governments to cooperate with the international system, and that system decreases war.
When George W. Bush came to office, having campaigned for a more humble foreign policy, he immediately withdrew from much international cooperation and chose a more unilateralist, go-it-alone policy based on his government's wisdom more than international consultation. He announced intentions to oppose or withdraw from the Kyoto Accords to reduce global warming, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, the inspections necessary for implementation of the Biological Weapons Treaty to prevent these weapons of mass destruction, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to prevent militarization of space, and the International Criminal Court to make egregious violators of human rights responsible for their actions. He criticized and undermined South Korean president Kim Dae Jung's steps of peacemaking with North Korea, and dis-engaged from efforts to make peace between Israel and Palestine.

This has caused much resentment by other nations, which said the U.S. was not listening to their concerns. The U.S. responded by hiring a public relations expert to get other nations to listen more sensitively to U.S. concerns. ÒWhen the White House decided it was time to address the rising tides of anti-Americanism around the world, ... it hired one of Madison Avenue's top managers.... So why, only five months in, does the campaign... seem in disarray?.... Muhammad Abdel Hadi, an editor at the newspaper Al Ahram, left his meeting with [the public relations director] frustrated that she seemed more interested in talking about vague American values than about specific U.S. policies. ÔNo matter how hard you try to make them understand,' he said, Ôthey don't.'" ÒIf they are angry, as millions clearly are, it's because they have seen those promises betrayed by U.S. policy... They point to U.S. unilateralism in the face of international laws, widening wealth disparities, crackdowns on immigrants and human rights violations...."[14]

U. S. disengagement from the peacemaking process between Palestine and Israel left a very weak Palestine without hope while Israeli settlements and bulldozing of Palestinian homes kept increasing, and the administration appears now to realize this has been a disaster. The United States, for the first time, has made clear that the outcome of a peace process should include a Palestinian state. The question is whether the United States will push with enough firmness to help both sides take the necessary initiatives to start a realistic peace process that can work toward that end.

Once the attack of 9-11 occurred, it became clear that the only effective way to fight terrorism requires an international coalition. To learn where terrorist networks are and to cut off their financing, as well as to attack them militarily, requires the support of a large coalition of nations. Accordingly, the force of the international system has partly turned U.S. foreign policy toward coalition-building. Yet, as reported by David Little of Harvard,

In the president's September 20 speech to Congress, he made not one reference to the UN or to article 51 of the Charter, nor has he shown in subsequent speeches the slightest interest in the subject.... Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld virtually ignored international norms in his regular televised briefings on military action in Afghanistan.... Unfortunately, a large part of the problem with the president's misbegotten order authorizing irregular military tribunals was its utter indifference to, if not defiance of, human rights and international rule-of-law standards....The
administration at first disregarded the application of international norms--in this case, the Geneva Conventions--to persons detained in connection with military action in Afghanistan.... Reversing an earlier decision, the president recently declared that the third Geneva Convention, guaranteeing humane treatment for prisoners of war, will now apply to Taliban captives, but...neither prisoner-of-war status nor the Geneva Conventions will apply to al-Qaeda detainees....[15]

Are there forces that will nudge the administration toward greater cooperation with international networks and less unilateralism? Or will the power of the U.S. tear the cooperativeness of those networks, or perhaps create more militarily based networks? We have already seen strong negative international reaction, and accordingly some shift in administration style. In Afghanistan, for example, the United States has encouraged international cooperation. But it has also blocked support for policing beyond Kabul, the capitol. There is clear consensus on the importance of democratization, economic opportunity, and reducing weapons trade in Afghanistan. The U.S. government is now somewhat more engaged with the international community. The administration has seen the need for an international coalition to combat terrorism, and therefore more consultation. The U.S. needs cooperation from Muslim nations, and these are opposed to war against Iraq; yet President Bush has invested enormous personal prestige in his campaign to force Saddam Hussein out of office. Will the international coalition restrain U.S. action and pressure Hussein to allow inspections? Or will war begin?

We may be seeing international antipathy against U.S. unilateralism as one factor in the clearly observable withdrawal of money from the U.S. stock market, and thus the extensive drop in the stock market and the value of the dollar (the result of international investors deserting dollar investments). This is of course combined with some antipathy against U.S. corporate unilateralism ignoring legal and moral restraint. Should this continue, or should war on Iraq cause an oil shortage and an inflationary rise in oil prices, the economic results may threaten the continuity of the Bush administration. We may already be seeing the force of the international community working for cooperation and against unilateralism more than is being generally noticed. We may also be seeing the economic downturns tearing at the system.

Encourage Grass-Roots Peacemaking Groups and Voluntary Associations

For succinctness, I skip the practice of reducing offensive weapons and weapons trade, and mention only briefly the growing numbers of grass-roots peacemaking groups. I have sought to point realistically to some of the forces that block preventive initiatives, as well as some of the forces that push for preventive measures. Citizen groups are not acting alone; forces that support peacemaking initiatives are already operative. This may give a greater sense of empowerment to groups that seek to turn the discussion deeper. They are not alone. Just peacemaking theory shows what practices are empirically effective in decreasing terrorism and bringing increased security. This can make citizen action more realistic. Without citizen action and government initiatives that deal with underlying injustices, more terrorist attacks can be expected. Israel has demonstrated that reliance on suppression alone has not worked well. Whether the campaign against terrorism becomes simply a war or more a cooperative coalition is yet to be seen.


[6] I wish to credit an unpublished manuscript from Charles Kimball for this information without making him responsible for its exact wording. See his forthcoming When Religion Becomes Evil.


[9] Ibid., 69.


